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Abstract
Pico is a token-based login method that claims to be simultaneously more usable and more
secure than passwords. It does not ask users to remember any secrets, nor to type one-time
passwords. We evaluate Pico’s claim with two deployments and user studies, one on a web-
based service and another within an organization. Our main aim is to collect actionable intelli-
gence on how to improve the usability and deployability of Pico. In our first study we team
up with an established website, Gyazo, to offer this alternative login mechanism to users intent
on performing a real task of image sharing. From the lessons of this first study, we retarget
Pico’s focus from replacing web passwords to replacing desktop login passwords; and thus in
our second study we engage with a government organization, Innovate UK, to offer employees
the ability to lock and unlock their computer automatically based on proximity. We focus particu-
larly on the ecological validity of the trials and we thereby gain valuable insights into the viability
of Pico, not only through the actual responses from the participants but also through the many
practical challenges we had to face and overcome. Reflecting on the bigger picture, from our
experience we believe the security usability community would greatly benefit from pushing
towards greater ecological validity in published work, despite the considerable difficulties and
costs involved.
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It is astonishing that the number of passwords that each of us must
use continues to increase year on year, despite users regularly rating
passwords as a major inconvenience and security professionals citing
weak or reused passwords as some of the most commonly exploited
security vulnerabilities. Many talented researchers have proposed
innovative alternatives, but any claims of improvement over the us-
ability of passwords must necessarily be validated by user studies.
We might wonder why the positive feedback invariably gathered by
the creators of new authentication schemes in such studies does not
translate into widespread adoption of such schemes and the demise
of passwords. A large part of the answer is due to reluctance to
change and to the asymmetric incentives for the parties involved: the
pain of passwords is experienced by the prover but not by the veri-
fier, for whom passwords are often the cheapest and most conveni-
ent option. But another part of the answer might also be that several
user studies are insufficiently realistic, and thus excessively optimis-
tic in predicting the success of the new scheme they evaluated.
The key message of this article is that, to assess the usability of a
security mechanism (or, more specifically, of an authentication sys-
tem), there is ultimately no substitute for building it, deploying it
and trying it out ‘in the wild’, with people who will use it while
going about their usual daily tasks. This is because, except perhaps
for some system administrators, security is rarely anyone’s primary
goal: the primary goal is to access some resources and get one’s job
done, whereas the security mechanism, for the user, far from being
the goal, is an externally-imposed annoyance that gets in the way of
reaching the primary goal. Therefore, studying the usability of the
security mechanism in isolation, or with test subjects focused on the
security mechanism rather than on their primary task, may hide cru-
cial aspects of the whole story. It might for example hide the fact
that users are logging in less frequently in order to avoid the incon-
venience of interacting with the authentication scheme. Lab-based
and even MTurk-based experiments have their place in the earlier
stages of assessing new ideas and designs; but we advocate that, to
develop easier to use security systems, we must at some point build
and deploy those systems and verify how effectively they actually
solve the problems that real people face.
Our team had created Pico (Section ‘Background: the Pico user
authentication system’), an authentication solution designed to be
more secure and usable than passwords. In this article, we report on
two real-world deployments of Pico, intended to assess our own
claims about the system and, more generally, to improve Pico’s fit-
ness for purpose. The first deployment (Section ‘The website authen-
tication study with Gyazo’) was run in collaboration with Alexa
Top 500 website gyazo.com: Gyazo customers who participated in
our trial would log in to their account by scanning a QR code with
their smartphone rather than entering their username and password.
In collaboration with the service, we selected a suitable subset of the
customer base and ran surveys and interviews with them, before and
after monitoring their interactions with the site for two weeks. The
issues we encountered during this trial convinced us that the Gyazo
website, and perhaps websites in general, were not a setting in which
users felt the pain of passwords particularly strongly (Section
‘Discussion: the pain of passwords on the web’) given their available
and commonly used mitigations. We had to swallow our pride and
admit we had been attempting to solve a problem that users didn’t
really experience to any great degree. We therefore retargeted our
efforts towards a different setting (Section ‘The proximity-based lap-
top-unlocking study with Innovate UK’): employees logging into the
laptop provided by their organization, where we expected security
policies to be enforced more strictly, password managers not to be
available and thus the pain of passwords to be greater. We partnered
with Innovate UK, a government agency, pivoting from website
login to operating system login and porting our software to new
platforms: Windows for the back-end and iOS for the phone client.
We also introduced a new, simpler mode of operation: proximity-
based continuous authentication. By monitoring the Bluetooth sig-
nal from the user’s smartphone, we automatically unlocked the com-
puter in the presence of its user and locked it otherwise. This mode
seemed particularly well suited to the open plan offices common in
corporate environments. We encountered many problems in this se-
cond trial, which we document here to help other researchers stay
clear of them.
The main contributions of this article are as follows:
• We report on the first user study of Pico with actual users of a
popular website (Section ‘The website authentication study with
Gyazo’).
• We highlight the additional insights offered by having adopted a
setup with high ecological validity (Section ‘Discussion: the pain
of passwords on the web’), which partly explain why many pass-
word replacement schemes, including ours, get little traction.
Some of these explanations may sound obvious in hindsight, but
they were not to us at the time. We identify contexts where Pico
might do well in comparison to passwords or other alternatives.
• We use the intelligence thus gained to target a new and more ap-
propriate scenario: no longer logging into a web account but
automatically unlocking and re-locking a corporate laptop with-
in an open-plan office (Section ‘The proximity-based laptop-
unlocking study with Innovate UK’). Towards that, we radically
revisit the design of Pico and develop new software for it.
• We document our technical solutions, including the reverse-
proxy technique we created for allowing a website to offer a Pico
login without having to modify the website server itself (Section
‘Website login’). We release the Pico software as open source for
other researchers to experiment and build upon (Section ‘Open
source’).
• We candidly admit to our frustrations and failures (Section ‘The
proximity-based laptop-unlocking study with Innovate UK’),
alongside reporting on what went well. Our philosophy of build-
ing a system, deploying it in a real environment and measuring
its effectiveness for real users has a high cost and a lower prob-
ability of success, and we do not attempt to hide that. But we still
consider it worth the investment, and hope the security usability
community will adopt it more frequently in the future.
Background: the Pico user authentication system
Original design
Pico grew out of the basic observation that the password directives
commonly given by techies at the time (long, complex, and unguess-
able passwords; all different; and a prohibition to write them down)
were mutually contradictory and thus ultimately unethical, in that
they blamed the user for not doing something that could not reason-
ably be done. In its original clean-slate design, first presented by
Stajano in 2011 [1], Pico consisted of a single-purpose hardware
token that would remember arbitrarily many public key credentials
on behalf of its owner, a different one for every account, and would
stay locked and refuse to work unless it was within the authentica-
tion aura of its owner, as defined by the presence of wireless wear-
able accessories called Picosiblings.
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Stajano secured a generous grant from the European Research
Council and led an evolving team of researchers who, over five
years, incrementally prototyped, built, tested and improved upon
various aspects of this design. Practical constraints, experience from
previous trials, and sometimes the need to compromise on the ori-
ginal clean-slate design for interoperability with deployed systems,
all contributed to a gradual evolution and maturation of Pico’s
design.
Logging into a website originally involved, on the back-end, aug-
menting the login page with a QR code that contained the public
key of the website. The user wishing to log in would scan that code
with their Pico hardware token device (similar in functionality to a
smartphone, but single-purpose to minimize the attack surface) and,
provided the Pico device recognized the public key as that of a web-
site it had an account on, it would run a mutual authentication
protocol [2], based on Krawczyk’s well-established Sigma-I [3], in
which the Pico device would offer to the verifier its own public key
for that account.
We obviously faced the bootstrapping problem that no real web-
site would be running the Pico public key protocol until Pico was al-
ready widely deployed, and vice versa. To break the vicious circle
we developed a browser plug-in, the Pico Lens [4], that made regular
websites appear to the user as if they supported Pico, by displaying a
QR code for them on their login page. The Pico client device would
then effectively run the authentication protocol with the Pico Lens.
In turn, the Pico Lens would authenticate the user to the real website
by sending it a stored password, similarly to what a native in-
browser password manager does. That way, from a user experience
viewpoint, all websites would appear to support Pico, whether they
did so natively or not. (Of course those that didn’t would not benefit
from the additional security of public keys over static passwords.) A
limitation of this technique was that it involved fragile heuristics to
detect what was a login page and how to type username and pass-
word into it. We thus also designed and proposed a structurally better
solution that would have also helped other password managers [5].
We also evolved a variant of Pico that no longer required public key
cryptography [6].
We explored various ideas around the Pico security tokens [7]
and debriefed users on their acceptance of them using non-
functional prototypes made of plasticine and Polymorph [8]; in par-
allel, we developed various functional smartphone-based prototypes
of the software in the Pico client and Picosiblings. We eventually
abandoned the dedicated single-purpose hardware token for a more
mundane smartphone app when it became clear through focus
groups and user studies that few regular users would be willing to
carry a new gadget, however secure, and that they would naturally
prefer to trade security for convenience.1
Website login
The version of Pico that was used for our first public deployment
(Section ‘The website authentication study with Gyazo’) consisted,
on the client side, of an app for Android smartphones. On the server
side, if we were going to earn the collaboration of a real website, we
anticipated we would not be allowed to make any changes to their
production server. The Pico Lens would have worked, but it would
have required users to adopt the specific web browser (Firefox) for
which we had developed the plug-in; it would have also forced them
always to log in to their web account from the same computer,
whereas we would have preferred to allow them to roam between
computers and even log in from (say) an Internet café. This is be-
cause we expected that, while logging in from the same computer,
they probably would not be forced to enter their password very
often; either because of a long-lived login cookie or because their
browser’s password manager would remember the password for
them.
We thus developed an alternative architecture in which, instead
of putting a Pico proxy in front of the client (the Pico Lens
embedded in the user’s web browser), we put one in front of the ser-
ver. In this ‘reverse proxy’ design the user could log in from any
browser, without any plugins: they would just have to visit our
custom address https://pico.gyazo.com instead of the regular
https://www.gyazo.com. Our proxy web server would display a
QR code, perform mutual authentication with the user and then
embed an authentication cookie provided by Pico into the browser
session, before handing over the authenticated user to the real
Gyazo website [9].
We built our reverse proxy on top of NGINX and we injected
client-side Javascript using a sub_filter rewrite rule. This
allowed us to add the Pico QR code onto the Gyazo site’s usual login
form without altering any of the backend code.
As expected, the fact that we did not require Gyazo to modify
their server in any way, and indeed that users not taking part in the
trial would not even be aware of the existence of the Pico login
option, was a crucial facilitating factor in Gyazo’s decision to run
the trial with us.
Laptop login
For reasons that will be explained in greater detail in Section
‘Discussion: the pain of passwords on the web’, our next Pico de-
ployment was no longer to the (external) users of a website but to
the (internal) employees of an organization. We would now be log-
ging them into their corporate Windows laptop. This of course
involved a total rewrite of the Pico authentication back-end, as well
as its integration into Windows. Moreover, a majority of those
employees used iOS rather than Android, so the client side had to be
ported as well. We thus implemented a version of Pico in which the
Windows login screen would display a QR code: acquiring it with
the Pico app on your iPhone would then log you in.
In this context of local (rather than across-the-web) login, we
ventured into continuous authentication, part of the original design
of Pico: the idea of unlocking a device when within the aura of its
owner. When the laptop sensed that the user’s smartphone was near-
by, it would unlock; and when the user’s phone went out of range,
the laptop would lock. To sense proximity, we relied on Bluetooth
Low Energy RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indication). This in turn
limited the hardware we could use to models of laptop and phone
that implemented the relevant Bluetooth LE specifications.
Fortunately, this included the models of Lenovo laptops and Apple
iPhones issued to employees at our partner organization Innovate
UK. At this stage of exploration of the feasibility and acceptability
of various regions of the design space, we deemed usability much
more important than security and we therefore did not worry about
guarding against relay attacks.
1 The banking industry drew similar conclusions. Banks are now happy to
offer smartphone banking apps to their customers, lest they switch to the
competition.










We documented and released the Pico software as Open Source at
https://github.com/mypico, including the various Android, iOS
and Windows versions used in the trials described in this article.
The software is offered as is, without any maintenance or support
since all the team members have now moved on to other projects,
but in the hope it will be useful to other researchers. If you make
use of the Pico software in your research, please acknowledge it by
citing this article.
The website authentication study with Gyazo
Background
About Gyazo
Gyazo,2 an Alexa Top 500 website, is an image capture and sharing
service that offers two primary modes of operation. Users can either
capture a portion of their desktop as a screenshot using an applica-
tion installed on their computer, or upload images captured through
other means directly to the site. The website interface then allows
images to be organized, tagged and shared with others, but Gyazo
has focused particularly on providing a frictionless workflow for
capturing partial screenshots. The user simply launches the applica-
tion, at which point they can drag a bounding box over the screen to
capture an image. The interface is minimal: the mouse cursor
switches to a crosshair design and once the drag is complete the
image is automatically uploaded and displayed in the browser. The
authentication process is subtle. The Gyazo application stores a
non-expiring identity token that it uses to authenticate when
uploading an image. This is stored in the user’s home folder so that
images can be uploaded without any further credentials being
requested from the user. While this token allows images to be
uploaded, it does not allow any deeper web access to the user’s ac-
count. For this, the user must log in manually using username and
password. The gyazo.com website also uses browser cookies to
maintain a login session; these cookies expire after one month.
Our Pico implementation does not affect image upload and the
identity token, but rather focuses on access to the website. As shown
in Fig. 1, Pico adds a QR code to the login page alongside the trad-
itional username and password fields. The user loads up the Pico app
on their phone and scans the QR code. A few seconds later, they are
authenticated and the website automatically refreshes to show that
they are logged in. Pico uses the data in the QR code to trigger a back-
ground authentication, and from the user’s perspective the site
refreshes and moves from the login page to their account dashboard.
Our experiment
We conducted a three-part user study exploring the usability,
deployability and perceived security of Pico when used for authenti-
cation to Gyazo. We targeted the subset of Gyazo users who, based
on their usage patterns, would find Pico most useful and asked them
to use Pico to log in to Gyazo for a period of two weeks. We col-
lected participant feedback and produced a rich set of quantitative
and qualitative data including telemetry, ratings, free-text responses
and interviews. The number of people involved at each stage is
detailed below and summarized in Table 1. We consistently refer to
these Nx throughout the article.
In the first stage, out of the N0 > 9 million active users of
Gyazo, we asked the company to tell us which ones logged into the
Gyazo website with relatively high frequency (defined as ‘manually
entered their Gyazo password at least once during the previous
week’). To the resulting N1 ¼ 1136 users we sent a questionnaire,
whose purpose was to understand why they logged in more fre-
quently than other users; of these, N2 ¼ 268 opened it and N3 ¼ 85
completed it. The demographics of these N3 ¼ 85 are in Table 2.
In the second stage, we narrowed down to those willing to par-
ticipate in a trial, who owned an Android phone and who matched
our demographic criteria for a representative sample of the popula-
tion. We invited the resulting N4 ¼ 29 users to download the Pico
Gyazo app and take part in a trial. Of these, N5 ¼ 12 downloaded
the app and N6 ¼ 11 of them completed setup and used it for two
weeks, thereby participating in the second stage of the study. All of
them, N7 ¼ 11, completed an exit questionnaire. Their demograph-
ics are in Table 3.
In the third stage, the N7 ¼ 11 Stage 2 participants were invited
to take part in a debriefing interview. N8 ¼ 7 agreed to speak with
us and we were eventually able to arrange and conduct interviews
with N9 ¼ 5 of them (Table 4).
The two questionnaires and the script for the semi-structured
interviews are included in the online Supplementary Data that ac-




Participants install our Pico Gyazo app for Android, a 4.16 MB
download, via Google Play. The first time users open the app, they
are invited to enter their Gyazo username and password (Fig. 2,
left), which are remembered by the app for future logins. Users are
then presented with a QR code scanner (Fig. 2, right). From this
point on, until users clear the app data (which only one of the users
did during the trial), opening the app will bring them directly to the
scanner page. The interface is simple and consists of just this one
screen.
We peppered both the app and the proxied Gyazo login page
with keen.io3 calls to collect event-based telemetry data. These
Figure 1: the Gyazo login screen with a Pico QR code
2 The Gyazo service is offered at the https://gyazo.com/ website and is
maintained by Nota Inc.
3 https://keen.io/
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allowed us to measure timings for various stages of the login pro-
cess, including startup, configuration, scanning the QR code and
completion. The full set of events is shown in Tables 5 and 6 for the
Pico app and login page respectively.
For the configured phone we were able to form an identifier for
the user, generated as a salted hash of their Gyazo username and
sent with each event. This ensured that data were kept anonymized
as they passed through keen.io (since publicly the hashes cannot be
reversed), but could be de-anonymized by us given our knowledge
of the participants’ Gyazo usernames. However, events generated
for the unconfigured app and for the website had no access to
the username. Consequently, we also collected the IP address and
a random channel identifier freshly generated during every connec-
tion handshake between the app and browser. This allowed us to
correlate events even where the user was not immediately
identifiable.
Data analysis
Owing to the small sample sizes in our study, we report on the quan-
titative results using descriptive rather than inferential statistics.
In Stage 3, we conducted N9 ¼ 5 in-depth interviews that
were audio recorded and later transcribed to provide qualitative
data. The interviews lasted 26 minutes on average (range: 19–36)
and the transcripts were on average 3917 words long (range:
3099–5637).
The transcripts were analysed using Braun and Clarke’s thematic
analysis [10] as follows. Two researchers coded the first interview
independently and then created a joint codebook, based on which
they coded the remaining four interviews. After this, they merged
their codebooks and re-coded all five interviews in line with this
codebook. The inter-rater reliability was high with a Cohen’s Kappa
coefficient of 0.84, which is considered to be excellent in statistical
textbooks such as Fleiss et al. [11].
Research ethics
The study was conducted after having been approved by the Ethics
Committee at the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory
(approval number: 384; approval date: 2016-07-28).
Results
Initial questionnaire
When we refer to participants in the N3 ¼ 85 questionnaire, we
speak of ‘respondents’ abbreviated as ‘R01’ for ‘Respondent 1’.
We asked the respondents how often they manually typed in
their Gyazo password: most did so less than once per week
(Table 7).
Table 1: an overview of the number of people during the different




N0 >9 million Users on Gyazo
N1 1136 Were contacted based on frequency of login
N2 268 Opened the invitation
N3 85 Completed the initial questionnaire (Stage 1)
N4 29 Were invited to download the Pico Gyazo
app for Android
N5 12 Downloaded the app
N6 11 Logged into Gyazo using Pico for two weeks
N7 11 Completed the exit questionnaire (Stage 2)
N8 7 Agreed to be interviewed
N9 5 Were interviewed (Stage 3)
Table 2: demographics (gender, age and location) of the N3 ¼ 85 Stage 1 participants
USA 26 Norway 2 Greece 1
Japan 13 Bangladesh 1 Italy 1
18–24 56 UK 12 Brazil 1 Latvia 1
Male 69 25–34 18 Canada 7 Colombia 1 Portugal 1
Female 12 35–44 7 Russia 3 Czech Republic 1 Romania 1
Prefer not to say 4 45–54 2 Israel 2 Estonia 1 Spain 1
55–64 2 Lebanon 2 France 1 Sweden 1
Netherlands 2 Germany 1 Taiwan 1
Vietnam 1
Table 3: demographics (gender, age and location) of the N7 ¼ 11
Stage 2 participants
Male 8 18–24 9 USA 6 Greece 1
Female 1 25–34 2 Japan 1 Latvia 1
Prefer not to say 2 Brazil 1 Spain 1
Table 4: demographics (gender, age and location) of the N9 ¼ 5
Stage 3 participants
Male 2 18–24 4 USA 4
Female 1 25–34 1 Latvia 1
Prefer not to say 2
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Next, with an open-ended question, we asked them to explain
the main reason why they had to enter their password; 65 of the
N3 ¼ 85 provided an answer to this question. Switching to another
device was mentioned in 19 cases; for example, R82 wrote: ‘Signing
in on a different computer’. Seventeen respondents explained that
they needed to enter a password in order to log in and access their
images. Our intention had been to understand why respondents had
to enter their password given the service sets long-lived cookies:
their literal interpretation of the question suggests we should have
phrased it more carefully. In 15 cases, respondents stressed they had
to enter their password after clearing their cookies. R54 explained:
‘Because i clear my cache at the end of the day to speed up the
browser’. Seven respondents mentioned having to log in to Gyazo
when switching to another browser. Six respondents said their per-
ception was that they were never asked to enter their password. In
four cases, the respondents said that they had to enter it if their pass-
word manager/browser failed to do it for them; R57 explained:
‘SafeInCloud doesn’t actually work’. Three respondents mentioned
they entered their password manually because of security reasons;
R17 wrote: ‘I never use the option in Chrome save password be-
cause of that and also I think its safer to type the password every-
time’. Interestingly, two respondents also mentioned they logged out
intentionally in order to practise their password, as R18 explained:
‘To better memorize it’.
We asked respondents what their password management meth-
ods were. They could choose from a list of eight options and add
their own (Table 8). The most popular password management strat-
egy was letting the browser remember the password, employed by
63 respondents (74.1%), followed by 30 respondents (35.3%) who
used the same password across multiple sites and 19 (22.4%) who
used a password manager / plugin / extension.
Telemetry results
The Pico app was downloaded by N5 ¼ 12 participants but one par-
ticipant never used it to authenticate. Overall, we recorded 45 au-
thentication events across N6 ¼ 11 active participants (M¼4.1
authentication events per participant; range: 1–14).
For each authentication event, our telemetry collected the timings for
the following authentication steps: starting the app, loading the Gyazo
login page, scanning the QR code, successful authentication and confirm-
ation from the website (cfr. Tables 5 and 6). An authentication event
lasted an average of 47.5 s (range: 8–292). Of the 45 authentication
events recorded, three were missing telemetry data for some steps and
were therefore excluded from subsequent analysis. Out of the remaining
42 fully recorded events, 23 started with the participant opening the Pico
app and then opening the page, while 19 started with them loading the
Table 5: events generated by the Pico app
Starting unconfigured Successful authentication
Starting configured Checking username and password
Configuration complete Credentials checked out
Scanned QR code Incorrect credentials
Scan cancelled by user Open credentials page
Attempting login
Table 6: events generated by the login page
Page loaded and updated
Error getting new channel
Pico accepted message on Rendezvous channel
Message from Pico authenticated
Figure 2: the configuration screen (left) and scanner interface (right)
Table 7: self-reported frequencies with which respondents manual-
ly typed in their passwords on gyazo.com (N3 ¼ 85)
Less than once per week 59 69.4%
At least once per week but less than once per day 8 9.4%
Roughly once per day 9 10.6%
Roughly 2–4 times per day 7 8.2%
Roughly 5 or more times per day 2 2.4%
Table 8: self-reported methods by which Gyazo study respondents
managed their passwords (N3 ¼ 85, multiple choices allowed)




Password generator 13 15.3%
Reset password by email when I need to log in 14 16.5%
Password containing personal information 4 4.7%
Stored in a file/on a piece of paper 10 11.8%
Using the same password on multiple sites 30 35.3%
No special methods (I just remember
all of my passwords)
17 20.0%
Other 10 11.8%
Table 9: a break-down of steps needed for an authentication event
using the Pico app to log in to Gyazo, with durations in seconds. The
duration of each step is the interval between a ‘from’ and a ‘to’
Step no. Authentication step: from, to Mean
Step 1 Start Pico app, load page; or: load
page, start Pico app
34.55
Step 2 Start Pico app, scan QR code 9.62
Step 3 Scan QR code, successful authentication 2.40
Step 4 Successful authentication, confirmation
from website
0.93
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page and then opening the app. Table 9 shows the average times for
each of the steps. For the first step, if participants started by opening the
app and then went on to open the Gyazo website, it took them on aver-
age 35.2 s, whereas the other way around it was 33.7. All four steps
depended on the response time of various computers and networks, but
Steps 1 and 2, which feel quite slow, also depended on the participants’
speed. The Pico protocol involves the usual POST request—sent by the
Pico to the website—needed to authenticate the user, followed by four
messages sent between the Pico and the user’s browser (two in each dir-
ection) to securely install the cookie. The timings of Steps 3 and 4 are in
line with what we would expect to see.
Questionnaire and interview results
Since both questionnaires and interviews touched upon similar
themes, we group their results by theme. As above we refer to partic-
ipants in the questionnaires (N3 ¼ 85 or N7 ¼ 11) as ‘respondents’
abbreviated as ‘R01’. When we refer to participants in the inter-
views (N9 ¼ 5), we speak of ‘interviewees’, abbreviated as ‘I01’.
Primary task—Gyazo
We began each interview by asking the interviewee about their use
of Gyazo, in order to ground their perceptions of Pico in the primary
task of using the service. Two interviewees had been using the ser-
vice for two years, two for one year and one only signed up a month
before the study. All interviewees used it for personal use, and one,
an artist, also used it for professional reasons. Four interviewees
stated that they were not currently premium users; one told us that
they used to be a premium user but no longer found it affordable.
Two mentioned that they used Gyazo on a daily basis.
We asked the interviewees in what situations they had to enter
their password. Two stated that they had to enter it when they
deleted cookies; two said that they needed to enter it when they
switched devices or shared them. Most people stay logged in long-
term, and as a result three interviewees reported that they had to log
out deliberately to use Pico in the trial.
Perceptions of Pico
Three interviewees found Pico to be easy to use. Two described it as
‘fairly quick’, and two as convenient. I04 explained: ‘I thought it
was very effective, it was very quick, very easy, convenient. . . I
definitely, I like the idea versus having to put in the password every
time’. I02 explained how the swift login with Pico was an encour-
agement to log in more often: ‘I used [Pico] on my college computer
a couple of times, and it was just more convenient [. . .] like I need to
show a fellow student an image or something like that, so it was just
a lot easier to just pop onto the desktop and scan in, so, slightly
more, yeah, than using a password’. Two interviewees also
described Pico as ‘cool’.
In the exit questionnaire (Stage 2), we asked the respondents
to what extent they agreed with eleven statements about Pico on a
five-point Likert scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’
(Fig. 3).
Respondents disagreed the strongest with statement 9, express-
ing they were not concerned about others observing the QR code
when they logged in to Gyazo. Respondents agreed the strongest
with statement 3, saying it was easy to learn how to use Pico and
statement 7, that the Pico-Gyazo app was straightforward to install.
The scores for cognitive effort tended to be low (meaning
good), with four participants indicating that they disagreed strong-
ly with statement 1 (i.e. they felt Pico does not require cognitive ef-
fort). In the interview, we asked one participant who agreed with
the statement (score: 2) to elaborate on their rating. It turned out
that the participant was unsure about the meaning of the word
‘cognitive’. After an explanation of what it meant, they revised
their score saying: ‘I don’t think there’s any [cognitive effort], be-
cause you don’t really have to remember anything, you just have to
unlock, you know, your password on your phone, and it’s pretty
much you use it daily, so the chances of you forgetting it is pretty
much non-existent’ (I03).
Familiarity with QR codes
Three participants said that they were already familiar with scan-
ning QR codes: I01 had used them with the Nintendo 3DS, I05 as
part of the LINE messaging app, and I02 as part of a school project.
Two interviewees found QR codes inconvenient because of the fact
that scanning them required having their phone at hand. I01
explained: ‘I worked with QR codes before so it wasn’t too hard to
work with. It just seemed a little bit inconvenient. I mean, getting
out my phone and, ‘cos I don’t usually have my phone on me when
I’m at the computer, it’s usually somewhere else, so I had to bring
Figure 3: statements capturing aspects of the user experience of Pico in the exit questionnaire of the Gyazo study (N7 ¼ 11). The darker the shading, the more the
participant agreed with the statement
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my phone over and I had to scan the screen’. I03 experienced some
problems with scanning a QR code because of a low quality phone
camera and monitor, saying: ‘the problems were coming I think
from my monitor, my old one, I had the really old one, the big one,
CRT monitor, which basically, every time I tried to scan it, it was
flickering, so it’d make it harder to scan it’.
Pico versus passwords
We asked our interviewees to compare Pico to passwords. Two par-
ticipants found Pico was more convenient, and two found it was
faster than passwords. Three interviewees thought that Pico was
more secure than passwords. When asked about the security of Pico,
I04 said: ‘I think I put it as around the same’ but then explained that
in its current state, Pico might be more secure because it had not been
a target for attackers yet: ‘I don’t really know what the exact basics
are between getting into an account using someone’s password, so not
exactly sure how someone would hack you using Pico, but I guess
technically it would be more safe because the technology isn’t out yet,
but they’d figure it out eventually, if it becomes a major thing’.
Two interviewees argued that passwords were better because
Pico was slower than entering a password. I03 thought that pass-
words were more secure because they existed only in the user’s
memory: ‘if you have a secure password and you’re pretty much the
only one person who knows it, I think that’s the most secure thing
you could possibly have’.
Suggestions for improvements
In the exit questionnaire, we provided respondents with a list of eight
possible improvements that could be made to Pico and asked them to
rank these in order of priority from the most to the least important (Fig.
4). The improvement ranked first most often referred to introducing
login with Pico to more websites than just Gyazo; it was ranked either
first or second by seven out of eleven respondents. The issue that was
ranked bottom most often (four times) was removing the need to scan
the QR code, although it was also ranked first by two participants.
Apart from the ranking task, respondents were also asked if they
had any other suggestions. Four respondents made suggestions
related to security, specifically login security and recovery from loss.
The login-related suggestions included requiring the user to enter a
username as an extra hindrance to potential attackers and requiring
two-factor authentication in certain contexts. The suggestions
relating to recovery from loss included creating a ‘button to disable
the Pico app in the website if the phone is lost or stolen’ (R01) and
having a fall-back login method if the phone is lost. Otherwise, two
respondents stressed that they would like to see Pico integrated with
more websites. R10 explained: ‘Just more websites, this is way more
easy to login into websites’. One respondent suggested other modes
of logging in apart from scanning a QR code, such as ‘timing tap
and voice recognition’ (R03).
Phone use habits
We also asked participants about their phone use habits to gauge
how Pico fitted into their routine. Two interviewees reported using a
pattern lock, two using a 4-digit PIN, and one not having a lock at
all. Participants provided all kinds of reasons for preferring one
method over another. I02 explained: ‘I don’t particularly care for
pattern locks because I have rheumatoid arthritis. So, using my
thumbs in that particular way is a bit painful, so for convenience
like I don’t. . .’ When asked what they were using instead they told
us: ‘I have a PIN on it. [. . .] But, but it’s also the PIN to my debit
card!’ The interviewee then went on to discuss how they thought fin-
gerprint scanners were the most convenient way of logging in. When
asked to compare the security of the different methods of locking
their phone, I02 responded: ‘I know that they can be compromised,
but at the same time I don’t necessarily think that affects most users.
Most people aren’t going to be maliciously attacked and have their
fingerprint stolen, but I think in higher security situations that might
be a problem. I wouldn’t, if I were say a diplomat, or something like
that, I don’t think I would trust my fingerprint that much you know,
but if it’s just an average Joe, sure, why not.’
In the exit questionnaire, we asked the respondents what method
of locking they would use if all their passwords were stored on their
phone. We provided them with six possibilities, of which the most
Figure 4: Gyazo study participants’ ranking of the different improvements that could be made to Pico (N7 ¼ 11). The darker the shading, the higher the priority
ranking of the improvement
Table 10: preferred ways to lock phone, with number of Gyazo
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popular were pattern lock and fingerprint scanner, with six men-
tions each (Table 10).
Password management strategies
When asked about their current password management strategies,
three of the N9 ¼ 5 interviewees said they used password managers
and three reused the same passwords for multiple systems.
I05 reflected on the fact that some accounts were more valuable
than others as they guarded access to other things. They explained:
‘for Google especially, it has to be incredibly secure because you’re
asking that to then be responsible for everything else; it’s like putting
your stuff in a safety deposit box in a bank where you don’t trust the
people running the bank’.
Contexts of use
We showed our respondents a series of eleven activities for which
they would normally authenticate, and asked them to choose if they
would rather use Pico, passwords or if they were indifferent in these
situations (Figure 5). While respondents’ preferences tend to be
evenly distributed between Pico, passwords and indifferent, no re-
spondent indicated passwords as their preferred choice for logging
in to a social networking site (e.g. Facebook) from a different
computer.
In the interviews, I03 explained Gyazo was a low-security con-
text: ‘the chances of someone stealing your phone and trying to log
in [to] your Gyazo is pretty low, and especially because there’s noth-
ing on it, you can just cheat the pictures and take pictures on that ac-
count’. Apart from the value of the account, frequency of use was a
consideration our interviewees mentioned. While one interviewee felt
passwords are more suitable for less frequent activities, two argued
passwords would instead be better for more frequent ones, saying: ‘it’s
easy for me to memorise passwords that I frequently have to log in to,
because that’s just how you memorise, is through use’ (I05). The inter-
viewee further explained where Pico would be a suitable authentica-
tion method: ‘say it’s that you only log in to once a month, maybe it’s
to pay your car insurance or something or a forum that you don’t go
on very frequently. I could see [Pico] being really handy because it
keeps it secure [. . .] instead of having to make a password for each
and every single unique obscure thing that you do, you know that
this, that the QR code gives you a level of security’.
Impact of reverse proxy on Gyazo customers
When developing the reverse proxy (Section ‘Website login’) we
were confident that it would be transparent to the end-user, but it
was reassuring that none of the participants claimed to have any dif-
ficulty understanding the login procedure using Pico.
Given the more involved protocol, and use of client-side
Javascript, we were less certain that the implementation would run
sufficiently quickly to satisfy user requirements. Once again we were
pleased with the results. The average time taken for our protocol to
complete was 3.33 s—a small proportion of the overall time users
spent during the authentication process, which averaged to 47.5 s.
The opinion of the N9 ¼ 5 participants who were interviewed dif-
fered on whether they perceived Pico to be faster (two participants)
or slower (two participants) than passwords.
Discussion: the pain of passwords on the web
What worked? What went wrong?
Analysis of the results we collected was at face value encouraging in
that, for example, a good proportion of respondents tended to agree
with positive statements about Pico (Fig. 3), rated the ability to use Pico
on other sites as the best potential improvement (Fig. 4) and preferred
passwords to Pico in only 2 of the 11 envisaged scenarios (Fig. 5).
On the whole, however, we cannot hide our disappointment at
the fact that, despite having successfully partnered with a website
boasting N0 > 9 million monthly active users, we managed to get
only N6 ¼ 11 of them to use Pico to log in, which removed any hope
of quantitative statistical significance for our results.
This gave us something to reflect on. Even just the drop
from N0 > 9 million users of Gyazo to N1 ¼ 1;136 users who had
logged in at least once in the previous week was a strong signal that
most users of Gyazo didn’t actually experience much of a problem
with passwords. Gyazo, like most successful websites that want to
retain their users, proactively removes any barriers that might
prevent users from accessing their accounts, for fear that they
might vote with their feet and stop using the site. Florêncio and
Figure 5: Gyazo study responses showing the numbers of participants who would prefer using Pico, passwords or indifferent for different everyday activities
(N7 ¼ 11Þ
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Herley [12] insightfully remarked back in 2010 that commercial
sites that must compete vigorously for user traffic have much more
lenient password requirements than government and university sites
that enjoy a captive audience. Effectively, Gyazo had already
practically solved the password problem for its users in over ðN0 
N1Þ=N0 ¼ 99:99% of the cases, firstly by not requiring a login for
the commonly used snapshot capture functionality but just for the
relatively less frequent operation of accessing your in-cloud pictures;
and secondly by installing long-lived login cookies that meant you
could usually access your Gyazo web account without having to re-
type your password.
It is significant that the few users we could debrief told us that
they would have liked Pico to remember all their other web pass-
words. Their password pain on the web came not from having to
type their Gyazo password too often, but from having to keep track
of dozens or hundreds of infrequently used accounts. This is a valu-
able insight: the ‘pain of passwords on the web’ has largely been
mitigated by long-lived login cookies and in-browser password man-
agers, and most of the residual pain, on the web, is in accessing in-
frequently used accounts, perhaps not from your usual computer.
Pivoting to a new scenario
The clear message from this Gyazo study, which in hindsight we
could have spotted even at Stage 1, was therefore that we failed be-
cause we were trying to offer a remedy to people who were not
experiencing enough pain. In order for Pico to be something that
people eagerly demanded, rather than just tried out of curiosity, it
had to address a situation in which users definitely felt a much
greater amount of password-induced pain.
After some brainstorming, we pivoted to the scenario of employ-
ees who had to unlock their corporate computer. Because they were
employees, rather than customers, they would probably be subject
(as indicated by the previously cited Florêncio and Herley [12]) to
the more draconian password requirements that system administra-
tors feel entitled to impose when they have a captive audience; and,
because they would not yet be logged into their machine at the time
of entering their password, they could not be exonerated from typ-
ing the password by a long-lived cookie or a password manager. On
the contrary, the corporate policy might even mandate automatic
locking after half an hour of inactivity, forcing them to retype their
password several times a day. This auto-locking policy, common in
corporate environments, is particularly annoying to users. We figured
that, if Pico relieved users from that burden, it could become very
popular. With continuous authentication we would be unlocking the
computer simply by walking up to it, not by scanning a QR code; and
locking it again automatically by walking away. By offering continu-
ous authentication, Pico would improve on both the usability (no
more password retyping) and the security front (the computer locks as
soon as you leave your desk, not half an hour later).
Of course, a moment’s thought shows that reality can be much
more complicated, for example when there are several computers in the
room on which one has an account. But the potential benefits were suf-
ficiently compelling that our team committed to supporting this feature.




Innovate UK is a hi-tech government agency that supports business-
led innovation. After initial engagement with their management and
their IT department, they generously agreed to run a live trial of the
new version of Pico we had chosen to develop. As an innovation-
oriented outfit they understood all too well that alpha and beta ver-
sions would have rough edges, but wanted to give us a chance to
iron them out by offering feedback as a friendly ‘client zero’. A use-
ful piece of software might one day turn into a successful business
and encouraging such endeavours aligned well with their mission.
Their employees had access to a variety of computing platforms
but we were told that their standard issue laptop was a Lenovo
Miix 720 running Windows 10, whereas their most common
smartphone was an Apple iPhone 7 running iOS 11. We were
asked to support those two platforms at a minimum. This involved
(besides procuring instances of those exact devices) a substantial
rewrite of our codebase, because our previous internal attempts at
OS login with Pico had instead targeted the Ubuntu Linux desktop
and Android smartphones.
Our experiment
The IT manager at Innovate UK was extremely supportive of our
endeavours but he was also a realistic person. While he was happy
to run pre-production software and support our experiments, he did
not want to inflict on his users a fragile system that did not meet
some minimum stability requirements. We therefore agreed on a
staged deployment (Table 11). In Stage 1, we would initially deploy
a feature-restricted version of Pico just to him (N10 ¼ 1), receive his
feedback, address any problems he experienced and add any features
he deemed necessary. Once he considered the software sufficiently
ready, for Stage 2 he would allow it to be deployed, on an opt-in
basis, to selected members of his system administration team. He
suggested N11 ¼ 11 people, whom we invited, and N12 ¼ 6 of them
accepted; but only N13 ¼ 3 of them were using compatible devices
and were thus able to engage fully with the trial, providing detailed
feedback and logs.
The plan was that, once the Stage 2 participants also gave their
OK, in Stage 3 Pico would eventually be made available, on a volun-
tary basis, to all employees of the organization (N14 ¼ 100þ). The
expectation was that about N15 ¼ 50 of them might want to run the
Stage 3 trial, which would last about a month. In terms of data col-
lection we planned to conduct initial interviews, surveys throughout
the trial and final debriefing interviews with at least some of the par-
ticipants. We agreed with the IT manager that the mark of Pico’s
success would be if Innovate UK employees spontaneously
demanded to continue to use it at the end of that trial month.
Table 11: an overview of the number of people during the different
stages of the Innovate UK study
Number of people Description of stage
N10 1 Just the IT manager evaluating Pico
(Stage 1)
N11 11 IT team members suggested by the IT
manager
N12 6 Subset willing to take part in trial
N13 3 Actually used Pico and sent us feedback
(Stage 2)
N14 Over 100 Employees in the organization
N15 About 50 Might have wanted to take part in trial (but
we never got to Stage 3)
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Unfortunately, we struggled with the reliability of Bluetooth and
we never went beyond Stage 2 of our plan. The data that we report
come from an initial interview with the IT manager, from emails,
from conversations on the phone and from face to face meetings
during three site visits. We never sent out any surveys as we felt our
software had not yet reached a sufficiently stable state.
As for demographics, we did not get to the stage where we could
have selected a balanced mix of participants representative of a
broader population. For the record, the N13 ¼ 3 participants of
Stage 2, which included the lone participant of Stage 1, were all
male and (as members of the IT team) highly IT literate.
Experimental methodology
Data collection and analysis
Our quantitative data are limited because, given our ideological
commitment to privacy, login data were initially stored only on the
user’s phone. Participants had the option of sending the logs to us
through the Pico app, but they usually did so only when they experi-
enced a problem. We received about 30 such log files, totalling
about 600,000 log entries. We were also able to capture and look at
debug data from the iPhone and Windows software in real time dur-
ing our site visits to Innovate UK. This allowed us to inspect pro-
gram execution state as well as the packets transmitted between the
devices.
We analysed the data using Braun and Clarke’s thematic analysis [10]
and focused on pivotal events (e.g. first encounter).
Research ethics
The study never went beyond the scoping stage (Stage 2), so we did
not apply for an ethics approval with our university. However, we
were cognisant of the potential security implications of working
with real users as part of their real work routine. User privacy and
security were therefore our highest priority.
The software was developed with security and privacy in mind.
We then also contracted an independent penetration testing com-
pany to perform a whitebox security audit before deploying Pico to
users.
The trial was entirely on an opt-in basis without any pressure or
incentive to participate. All of the participants were both IT and se-
curity literate and were able to make their own risk assessment.
They were in fact assessing a range of different security products at
the same time as our trial and this formed part of their work.
No analytics were transferred from the devices, but users did
have the option to send us logs, which they were also able to view
themselves before sending. We collected some data directly from the
device in the presence of the users concerned (a necessary restriction
because admin access was needed in some cases, and we neither had
access to user passwords nor wanted it).
Although the logs and onsite analysis captured data transmitted
between the phone and tablet over the Bluetooth link, only cipher-
text was captured, without the keys needed to decrypt it. This
allowed us to establish timing and size of packets, but not the
content.
Trial diary
The working prototype of OS login using Pico that we had when we
originally contacted Innovate UK used an Android phone to log in
to the Ubuntu Linux desktop and therefore, before our trial could
even be approved by Innovate UK management, we first had to in-
vest considerable development effort in porting the client side to iOS
and the server side to Windows. In this section, we chronicle the sali-
ent points of our development effort.
The ‘continuous authentication’ functionality we planned to test
was heavily reliant on recent BLE capabilities, specifically a continu-
ous BLE connection being maintained between the user’s phone and
their laptop. A ping-pong communication was triggered by the
phone every two seconds and, if the laptop failed to receive a com-
munication within five seconds, the laptop would lock. The locking
functionality therefore relied on reliable and timely communication
between the phone and laptop. On deployment, we were aware of
some situations where this system would fail and the connection
would drop out. For example, the Windows Credential Provider
was set to restart every 30 s and, if a connection was made in the
small window of time during which it was restarting, the authentica-
tion request would be refused.
After initial deployment, it became clear that unintended connec-
tion failures like this—but with different root causes—were happen-
ing rather more frequently than anticipated. This had the effect of
locking the user’s computer, often for no apparent reason and while
the user was in the middle of doing something. This was unaccept-
able, so we focused heavily on addressing this issue.
The greatest challenge we encountered was that we were un-
able to fully replicate all of the failures on our own devices. As
an example, some of the messages sent from the iPhone would ar-
rive corrupted. We weren’t able to replicate the behaviour, but
we could see the effect clearly in log files extracted from a phone
on-site. We had initially chosen not to collect the actual data
transmitted in the logs, just the timestamps; but no obvious pat-
tern emerged from the timing of the failures. Thus it wasn’t until
collecting more detailed logs in the presence of the user con-
cerned, and using his devices, that we noticed that the corruption
happened when the message size exceeded 254 bytes. But we still
didn’t know why it happened, and it still wasn’t happening on
our own identical hardware.
As a result of this and other unresolved technical issues, we
changed the functionality to require user intervention. If the user
moved away from their tablet or laptop, they would be prompted
with a notification to lock the device. Clicking the notification on
their phone would lock the device remotely, but the fully automatic
lock was removed to prevent the machine from locking unexpected-
ly in mid-use.
We also discovered that user perceptions of security (as opposed
to actual security) were far more important than we had anticipated.
For example, our software was criticized because it was unsigned,
leading to a warning being displayed by Windows on installation.
‘. . .when attempting to install it I was getting this system notifi-
cation [Windows unknown publisher warning]. It would put
other users off. Is there a way this can be circumvented?’ (P01)
To address this, we purchased a code-signing certificate, whereas
in a lab trial we might have simply asked the users to ignore the
warning, or manually installed the software on the user’s behalf.
It wasn’t until week 25 that we finally graduated to Stage 2 and
offered the app for use by more people within the organization. As with
the Gyazo trial, we had to reduce our expectations in terms of numbers.
Although the app was offered to N11 ¼ 11 people from within IT and
tech support, five of them chose not to engage. Of the remaining
N12 ¼ 6, it immediately became clear that three would not be able to
use the app because they used macOS on their laptops rather than
Windows, or Android on their phones rather than iOS. One of the
N13 ¼ 3 remaining users immediately experienced difficulties using Pico
with multiple accounts and with third-party app-sandboxing software:
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‘When pairing to mobile the pico app is populating my admin
credentials to pair – I am trialling [3rd party software] at the mo-
ment and as a result my personal AD [Active Directory] account
does not have administrator access, so I need admin credentials
to download/install/run programs.’ (P02)
The final user in the trial experienced a gap between the expect-
ation and reality of the app.
‘Sorry for sounding so negative about this product, I am sure
with some work it could be really good. I was hoping for some-
thing that would detect when you are outside of Bluetooth range,
then lock the machine when signal got weak. This APP still
requires manual intervention, which means users may as well
manually lock their laptop.’ (P03)
Indeed, our original vision for how Pico ought to work matched
what this user expected; but, as we said, we experienced false posi-
tives in the out-of-range detection that caused users to be locked out
while they were still sitting at their computer. To avoid that, we had
to add an inelegant manual confirmation.4
We also found that functionality that we thought would be
important for users, and that we spent some time developing,
turned out not to be as important as we had anticipated. For ex-
ample, the app was developed to handle multiple logins to multiple
devices with a UI designed to allow selection between them. In
practice, users were pairing with only a single device, and found
that the extra UI complexity added unnecessary steps to the login
process.
Lessons learnt
We found that, for authentication, reliability is key. The main road-
block for us in getting the hoped-for results in a live trial was the dif-
ficulty of achieving a level of reliability that would not have been
needed for a lab-based or ‘simulated’ trial. Even if participants in
lab-based studies complain about accuracy and reliability of security
software (e.g. as shown by Krol et al. [13] for facial biometrics),
they do not suffer the real-world consequences of not being able to
carry on with their primary task.
We were also necessarily very cautious about product security,
but also arguably over-protective of user privacy. As a result, we did
not collect enough data to be able to reproduce the problems that
occurred. This was not a consequence of the low number of users
involved, but rather of the approach chosen to collect data.
Passively collecting data as we had done in the Gyazo study would
have been a far more effective approach, in contrast to having par-
ticipants actively choose to send us logged data.
A clear piece of feedback received was that the visual appeal of
the app was important:
‘I think some work is needed with the app’s GUI. The pairings
menu is functional, but not exactly graphically pleasing. I am
wondering also whether you should have two app buttons, one
for the admin features and the other as a shortcut so that you
don’t have to click on the app, open the pairings screen and then
select the device you’d like to pair. If this could be done by simply
clicking on a shortcut on a mobile it would make it more attract-
ive from a user’s perspective.’ (P01)
User expectations in this area have become very high, and while
in a lab environment users may be persuaded to look past the
presentation of an app, this is unlikely to be the case if they’re asked
to use it in their day-to-day activities. This has particular relevance
for security solutions, since the substance (that is, whether or not the
solution is secure) is hidden, and it is inevitable that users will there-
fore focus on other indicators.
The phenomenon of associating visual appeal with functional
quality has been demonstrated by usable security research.
In their study on phishing, Wu et al. [14] showed that participants
could be tricked into submitting personal information 34% of the
time. Although participants were instructed to pay attention to the
toolbars in the browser, they assessed the legitimacy of the web-
sites they visited by how the web pages looked and felt. In a study
into two-factor authentication for online banking [15], a partici-
pant preferred a one-time password generator that looked more
stylish although the underlying functionality and usability was the
same.
Limitations of our studies
The numbers of participants in both studies are small. We can ex-
tract anecdotes and insights from them but we cannot extrapolate to
the general population.
In both studies, we had a low number of observations, meaning
login events. Pico did not become part of the users’ routines and we
could not observe habituation.
The drastic reduction in Ni as we progressed through the stages
of the first study might have caused self-selection bias in the partici-
pant group.
In the Gyazo study, participants tended to be younger. In the se-
cond study, they were IT professionals. Both groups might have
higher levels of computer literacy than the general population.
We did not have a control group. However, in the Gyazo study,
we secured a baseline against which we could compare Pico
by capturing participants’ experiences with passwords (cfr. the
questionnaires and interviews discussed in Section ‘Perceptions of
Pico’).
Related work
The literature identifying systemic problems with passwords as an
authentication mechanism is well-known and goes back to the
1970s with Morris and Thompson [16], but the quest to replace
passwords with better mechanisms has turned out to be a war of at-
trition. Over the years, numerous password replacement schemes
have been proposed and tested, each with benefits that turned out to
be too niche to achieve widespread adoption.
Biddle et al. [17] survey research into graphical passwords as a
replacement for textual passwords. They conclude that studies lack
consistency, often failing to achieve rigorous evaluation of security
or usability. The evaluation checklist they provide for addressing
these failings identifies user studies and ecological validity as an im-
portant factor.
The majority of studies evaluating authentication mechanisms
have been laboratory-based trials. The mechanisms studied include
graphical passwords, by Biddle et al. [17], Passfaces, by Davis et al.
[18] and grids, by Brostoff et al. [19] and Krol et al. [20] to name a
few. In reality, security-related actions are secondary tasks and a
4 Around the time of our trial, Apple introduced the ability to unlock a
macOS computer without a password when in proximity of the owner’s
unlocked Apple Watch. That was a commercial authentication product
that had clearly undergone several more orders of magnitude of hours of
development and testing than ours, and with much better hardware and
radio debugging facilities, but even they had chosen not to provide auto-
matic locking when the user went out of range, presumably for similar
reasons of not wanting to expose customers to frustrating false positives.
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study has to mimic this setup. Although Beautement and Sasse [21]
have been calling for robust authentication studies for a long time
now, many studies such as the one by Bonneau and Stechter [22] still
rely on simulated interactions in artificial setups, failing to consider
how authentication fits in with users’ daily activities. If the interac-
tions and logins are not real, the validity of the studies is limited,
argue Krol et al. [23].
While Felt et al. [24] have conducted in-the-wild studies for se-
curity warnings, literature about testing authentication mechanisms
in the wild is rare. This is not to say that testing itself is rare: we im-
agine it must be common in industry, but in contexts where the
incentives reward perfecting the product rather than writing about
it. A notable exception is the work by Brostoff and Sasse [25] who
studied Passfaces in a three-month field trial with 34 students. The
students had to use Passfaces and passwords to access their course
materials. The authors found that, when using Passfaces, partici-
pants logged in with a third of the frequency of logging in with pass-
words because the login process was more time-consuming.
Participants also stayed logged in for longer when using Passfaces.
In recent years, several studies have been conducted to assess the
user experience of token-based credentials. Most of them looked at
technologies that used a token as part of a two-factor authentication
solution. Strouble et al. [26] studied the introduction of the
Common Access Card (CAC) to the US Department of Defense
(DoD). The CAC is a smart card and photo ID, which DoD employ-
ees use for both opening doors and logging in to computers. The
introduction of the CAC had a significant negative impact on organ-
izational productivity: employees reported that the increased diffi-
culty of accessing their emails led them to log in less often when
outside their primary workplace. Also, over two thirds of employees
inadvertently left their CAC in the computer. The authors estimated
this resulted in a productivity loss of $10.4 million. Similarly, Steves
et al. [27] studied authentication in a large US governmental organ-
ization. They found that employees disliked using RSA’s SecurID
and the elaborate login procedure discouraged them from logging in
remotely. Krol et al. [15] studied the user experience of authentica-
tion tokens for UK online banking. They found that the need to
have a hardware token was a source of inconvenience and it changed
the way participants went about doing banking, decreasing the fre-
quency of login. Participants reported being less satisfied with online
banking when more steps were required for the login process and if
they had to use a hardware token. UK banks have since been shifting
from physical to software tokens to relieve their customers of the bur-
den of carrying an additional device for generating a one-time pass-
word. A preference for phone-based authentication has been
documented in real-life deployments. Colnago et al. [28] followed the
introduction of 2-factor authentication at Carnegie Mellon University
where staff and students had the choice between different methods for
generating passwords. The results show that 98% chose to use their
smartphone for Duo authentication. The three most frequent setups
users had were: push notification (91%), app-generated OTP (21%)
and hard token (4%).
There has also been a body of work focusing on making authen-
tication continuous. In 1992, Want and Hopper [29] proposed the
Active Badge that would log the user in to their workstation if they
were in proximity and check for their presence at several points dur-
ing a session. In 1997, Landwehr [30] proposed, patented (with
Latham [31]) and implemented a more robust approach—a system
that would continuously monitor the presence of an RFID token
worn by the user and, in its absence, disconnect the keyboard and
monitor from the computer. To address the vulnerability that an at-
tacker could still access the disk, in 2002 Corner and Noble [32]
presented (and later refined with Nicholson [33]) ‘Zero-Interaction
Authentication’. They implemented a system in which proximity of
an authentication token would unlock the keys of the laptop’s
cryptographic file system. The absence of the token would flush the
decrypted files from the cache and erase their decryption keys.
Another way to alleviate the password burden has been single
sign-on (SSO), in which a single master account (and therefore only
one password) provides access to multiple other services. The work by
Pashalidis and Mitchell [34] provides a useful taxonomy of the various
SSO systems based on two dimensions: local versus proxy (does the
entity the user authenticates to reside on the local computer or in the
network?) and true versus pseudo (is SSO supported by design, or do
several systems accept the same password?). Research into usable se-
curity has highlighted several shortcoming of real-world implementa-
tions of SSO. Linden and Vilpola [35] showed that, when using SSO,
users were unaware if they are logged in or not. For example, some of
their participants thought they logged out of all systems, while in real-
ity they logged out of only one. This raises security and privacy con-
cerns. Inglesant and Sasse [36] showed that in an organization that
used a pseudo-SSO implementation, employees were frustrated by the
need to enter the same password separately for every system and by
the frequency of lockouts. Ruoti et al. [37] found that users have con-
cerns about using one password for many systems, and in the case of
federated identity the trust towards the identity provider plays a role.
Bonneau et al. [38] identified three overarching classes of bene-
fits that an authentication mechanism should provide: usability,
deployability and security. In this study, we assess Pico’s usability,
deployability and perceived security. Analysis of the empirical us-
ability of a single-factor token-based password replacement that is
Memorywise-Effortless and Physically-Effortless (in the jargon of
Bonneau et al. [38]) is an under-explored area that would still bene-
fit from additional contributions.
Conclusions
We conducted the first two studies of a functional implementation
of Pico: one with the users of a website, Gyazo, engaging in remote
authentication across the Internet; and another with the employees
of an organization, Innovate UK, engaging in local login to their lap-
tops. Both studies took place in real environments and stand out for
their emphasis on high ecological validity.
In the Gyazo study, we sought to understand how useful Pico
might be as a replacement for passwords on a major website. The
insights we gleaned by debriefing our test subjects are valuable, but
hard to generalize given the small sample size.
Arguably, the most valuable lesson from this study is at the
meta-level: why was it that, on a site with over 9 million active
users, we managed to get only 11 people to try Pico? We deduced
that website users do not feel the pain of passwords as strongly as
some security usability researchers think they do.
As we said in the original workshop write-up of the Gyazo study [9],
we intended to use our findings to shape the future development of Pico.
In this article, we show that we did. We pivoted to a different scenario in
which the pain of passwords would be felt much more strongly, where
people would have to type a complex password several times a day and
could not be excused from typing it by a password manager or a long-
lived cookie. We didn’t care so much about publishing another paper,
but we really cared about applying Pico to a setting in which it could
solve a concrete and painful password problem that people were
experiencing.
In the Innovate UK study, however, despite our best efforts, we
could not make our implementation sufficiently robust in the face of
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unexplained and hard-to-reproduce Bluetooth dropouts. This regret-
tably prevented us from deploying Pico at scale to the corporate
audience we had originally envisaged.
Many usability studies in the literature are based on online sur-
veys or laboratory experiments where prototypes are used under
controlled conditions. If we had stuck to that paradigm, it would
have been much easier to collect hundreds of responses and derive
statistically significant results that would have looked good in scien-
tific publications, whereas by insisting on piloting our system with
actual users who go about their regular workday we ended up being
able to engage with only N7 ¼ 11 of them in the Gyazo study and
N13 ¼ 3 in the Innovate UK study. Yet we defend and advocate this
more challenging, more expensive and more frustrating approach as
the one that leads to results of much greater ecological validity.
While it is appropriate to test early ideas inexpensively in con-
strained, simulated environments such as the web survey or the lab
experiment with one’s own undergraduates, there remain major
qualitative differences between those settings and the real-world
ones in which the system would eventually have to operate. Looking
for answers by conducting a study on Amazon Mechanical Turk5 ra-
ther than through deploying the technology to actual users is
cheaper, simpler and more scalable, but may be akin to looking for
lost keys under the lamp post, because that is where it is easier to
see, rather than in the long, dark and smelly alleyway where they
may have actually been dropped.
We invested a considerable number of person-months of devel-
opment and debugging effort into the Innovate UK trial but, in the
end, we couldn’t get our system to work for our ‘client zero’ and
we don’t have any pretty graphs to show for it. Yet, we argue that
reporting this negative result is a more scientifically honest and ul-
timately more valuable assessment of our system than a hypothetic-
al lab study smugly reporting that x% of users had found Pico
better than passwords. We believe the academic community puts
undue pressure on reporting positive outcomes and this creates per-
verse incentives. If this is the playing field, it should come as no
surprise that a majority of the 35 authentication schemes from the
literature examined in the full version of Bonneau et al. [40] have
never seen any practical use. If only positive outcomes are publish-
able, and if publications are required to advance a researcher’s car-
eer, then academics will be steered towards building only as much
of a prototype as needed to be able to run a few lab studies, as
opposed to first building and debugging a solid working system,
and then witnessing how real users would react to it. Clearly, there
is a time and place for prototyping ideas cheaply before investing
engineering effort into them; but we argue that, once the novel
ideas have been explored conceptually, the true answers about
their worth can only be obtained by building a working system and
letting people use it in their daily life. Until we do this, our lab
studies are not validated by reality. Talented young researchers, es-
pecially those without a tenured position, should not be deterred
from engaging in solid system work as a foundation to their usabil-
ity studies by the fact that in the same time they could produce
more papers if they only built and tested the Hollywood façade
instead.
While the methodology of design / build / deploy / test / refine is
not novel in industry, in academic research it seems to have been
adopted primarily in hard-core technical areas, such as building
compilers and operating systems. In the emerging domain of studies
on the usability of security, instead, it is unfortunately still rare to
see the above cycle extend all the way to an end-to-end testing of a
working prototype used by non-technical people in their ordinary
workday. We do not claim that this end-to-end approach is a new
discovery, nor that nobody adopted it before us in this context; but
we argue that the field of security usability is now mature enough
that its practitioners would generally benefit from stepping up to
this higher standard.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data is available at Journal of Cybersecurity online.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to our colleagues David Harrison, Robert Irvine, Jeunese
Payne, Max Spencer, Quentin Stafford-Fraser, Matthew Wahab and Chris
Warrington for their contributions to the Pico project as well as to our exter-
nal collaborator Jiny Bradshaw whose Bluetooth know-how was invaluable.
We are particularly grateful to Nota Inc., the parent company of Gyazo, for
allowing us to integrate Pico into their site and recruit their users into our
study, and to Innovate UK for patiently trialling many versions of Pico over
several months in the shared hope that we would at some point nail down
those reliability issues. The Gyazo pilot study was originally written up as a
workshop paper by the same authors [9] and praised by the referees for its
emphasis on ecological validity. We were subsequently invited by the guest
editors to extend that work and resubmit it to this journal. The Innovate UK
pilot study was not previously written up anywhere else. Thanks to Paul van
Oorschot for insightful comments on a draft of this article.
Conflict of interest statement. None declared.
Funding
This work was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) [StG 307224,
Pico, to F.S.] and the extended visits of Gyazo inventor and CTO T.M. to
Cambridge were supported by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council (EPSRC) [EP/M019055/1, Future authentication systems, to F.S.].
References
1. Stajano F. Pico: No more passwords! In Proceedings Security Protocols
Workshop 2011, ser. LNCS, B. Christianson et al. (eds), Vol. 7114.
Springer, March 2011, pp. 49–81. [Online]; https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/
~fms27/papers/2011-Stajano-pico.pdf (22 June 2020, last accessed).
2. Jenkinson G, Spencer M, Warrington C et al. I bought a new security
token and all I got was this lousy phish—Relay attacks on visual code au-
thentication schemes. In Proceedings of Security Protocols Workshop
2014, ser. LNCS, B. Christianson et al. (eds), Vol. 8809. Springer, April
2014, pp. 197–215. [Online]; https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fms27/papers/
2014-JenkinsonSpeWarETAL-phish.pdf (22 June 2020, last accessed).
3. Krawczyk H. Sigma: The ‘SIGn-and-MAc’ approach to authenticated
Diffie-Hellman and its use in the IKE-protocols. In Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2003, International Cryptology Conference,
Santa Barbara, CA, August 17-21, 2003, Proceedings, ser. LNCS, Vol.
2729. Springer, 2003, pp. 400–25, invited paper. [Online]; https://iacr.
org/archive/crypto2003/27290399/27290399.pdf (22 June 2020, last
accessed).
4. Stajano F, Jenkinson G, Payne J et al. Bootstrapping adoption of the Pico
password replacement system. In Proceedings of Security Protocols
Workshop 2014, ser. LNCS, B. Christianson et al. (eds), Vol. 8809.
Springer, April 2014, pp. 172–86. [Online]; https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/
~fms27/papers/2014-StajanoJenPayETAL-bootstrapping.pdf (22 June
2020, last accessed).
5 The well-known crowdsourcing website as described, for example, by
Crowston [39].






/cybersecurity/article/6/1/tyaa010/5989371 by guest on 19 N
ovem
ber 2020
5. Stajano F, Spencer M, Jenkinson G et al. Password-manager friendly
(PMF): Semantic annotations to improve the effectiveness of password
managers. In Proceedings of Passwords 2014, ser. LNCS, Vol. 9393.
Springer, 2014, pp. 61–73. [Online]; https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/fms27/
papers/2015-StajanoSpeJenSta-pmf.pdf (22 June 2020, last accessed).
6. Stajano F, Christianson B, Lomas M et al. Pico without public keys. In
Proceedings of Security Protocols Workshop 2015, ser. LNCS, Vol. 9379.
Springer, 2015, pp. 212–23. [Online]; https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fms27/
papers/2015-StajanoChrLomETAL-public.pdf (22 June 2020, last accessed).
7. Stafford-Fraser Q, Stajano F, Warrington C et al. To have and have not:
Variations on secret sharing to model user presence. In Proceedings of UPSIDE
workshop of UBICOMP, Seattle, WA, 2014, pp. 1313–1320. [Online]; https://
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fms27/papers/2014-StaffordfraserStaWarETAL-presence.
pdf (22 June 2020, last accessed).
8. Payne J, Jenkinson G, Stajano F et al. Responsibility and tangible security:
Towards a theory of user acceptance of security tokens. In Proceedings
USEC 2016, February 2016, p. (10 pages). [Online]; https://www.cl.cam.
ac.uk/~fms27/papers/2016-PayneJenStaSasSpe-tokens.pdf (22 June 2020,
last accessed).
9. Aebischer S, Dettoni C, Jenkinson G et al. Pico in the wild: Replacing
passwords, one site at a time. In Proceedings European Workshop on
Usable Security (EuroUSEC 2017), 2017. [Online]; https://www.cl.cam.
ac.uk/~fms27/papers/2017-AebischerDetJenETAL-site.pdf (22 June 2020,
last accessed).
10. Braun V, Clarke V. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative
Research in Psychology 2006;3:77–101. https://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/abs/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa.
11. Fleiss JL, Levin B, Paik MC. Statistical Methods for Rates and
Proportions. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
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